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ABSTRACT 
We review emerging research on the psychological and biological factors that underlie social 
group formation, cooperation, and conflict in humans. Our aim is to integrate the intergroup 
neuroscience literature with classic theories of group processes and intergroup relations in an 
effort to move beyond merely describing the effects of specific social out-groups on the brain 
and behavior. Instead, we emphasize the underlying psychological processes that govern 
intergroup interactions more generally: forming and updating our representations of “us” and 
“them” via social identification and functional relations between groups. This approach 
highlights the dynamic nature of social identity and the context dependent nature of intergroup 
relations. We argue that this theoretical integration can help reconcile seemingly discrepant 
findings in the literature, provide organizational principles for understanding the core elements 
of intergroup dynamics, and highlight several exciting directions for future research at the 
interface of intergroup relations and neuroscience. (146 words) 
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The neuroscience of intergroup relations:  
An integrative review 
The human brain is "truly social", which is to say specialized for group living (Caporeal, 
1997; Dunbar, 1998). People who accurately identify, value, and cooperate with in-group 
members enjoy numerous benefits, including the fulfillment of many basic psychological needs 
(Allport, 1954; Correll & Park, 2005; Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005; Wilson & Wilson, 2007). The 
value humans place on group membership is illustrated by the ease with which humans form 
groups and favor in-group members. The propensity to prefer one’s in-group has been observed 
in every culture on earth (Brown, 1991) and in children as young as five (Dunham et al., 2011; 
Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Extensive research has shown that even arbitrary 
assignment to a group elicits preferences for in-group relative to out-group members across a 
wide variety of indices, and does so in the absence of factors typically thought to account for 
intergroup discrimination, such as prior contact with in-group or out-group members and 
competition over resources (Tajfel, 1970). 
The functional benefits of group membership notwithstanding, group life is also a source 
of social strife and destruction (e.g., pressure to conform within groups, protracted conflict 
between groups; Brewer, 1999; Cosmides, 1989; Hewstone et al., 2002; Neuberg & Cottrell, 
2006). Intergroup conflict, in particular, has been described as “one of the greatest problems 
facing the world today” (Cohen & Insko, 2008). For example, it has been estimated that over 200 
million people were killed in the last century due to genocide, war, and other forms of group 
conflict (Woolf & Hulsizer, 2004). The social and economic obstacles of group living have 
attracted the attention of scholars and scientists from social, developmental, evolutionary, and 
cognitive psychology, social neuroscience, biological and cultural anthropology, among others.  
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In the last few decades, there has been a surge of interest in the effects of group 
membership on basic perceptual, cognitive, and biological processes with the goal of better 
understanding how these processes, in turn, contribute to parochialism, prejudice, and intergroup 
conflict. This interdisciplinary approach—termed social neuroscience (Cacioppo, Berntson, 
Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000) or social cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner and Lieberman, 
2001)—to the study of intergroup relations has captured the attention of the scientific community 
(e.g., Kubota et al, 2012; Molenberghs, 2013), as well as the popular media and society more 
broadly (e.g., Brooks, New York Times, 9/12/09). This approach builds on the assumption that 
complex social phenomena, such as intergroup relations, may be better understood by combining 
social and biological theories and methods that traverse multiple-levels of analysis (Cacioppo & 
Cacioppo, 2013). Researchers in this area have already helped to bolster and refine existing 
psychological theories of intergroup relations (e.g., Derks, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2013), 
highlighted the contextual flexibility of seemingly “hard-wired” biological responses (e.g., 
Wheeler & Fiske, 2007; Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008), and challenged popular 
interpretations of biological systems (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2011). In the domain of intergroup 
relations, this approach may ultimately inform the design of better targeted interventions 
(including pharmacological interventions) for mitigating prejudice and intergroup conflict (e.g., 
Terbeck et al., 2012).  
To date, intergroup and cultural neuroscience has largely focused on specific social 
groups rather than studying the dynamics that govern group formation and intergroup 
interactions. Several excellent reviews have examined the neural basis of social categorization 
along boundaries marked by visual cues to targets’ group membership, such as race, sex, and age 
(e.g., Eberhardt, 2005; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Kubota et al., 2012); however, broader inferences 
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about group processes are often difficult to make on the basis of these social categories due to 
confounding variables (e.g., differences in the visual appearance of target stimuli, associated 
stereotypes and prejudices, and perceivers’ personal experience with groups in question). 
Furthermore, research that focuses exclusively on a single, static category boundary fails to 
account fully for the flexible nature of social identity representation (e.g., the effects of context 
on self-categorization, the effects of task on person construal; Freeman & Ambady, 2011). Thus, 
the next phase of intergroup neuroscience research must account for the fact that not all out-
groups are equivalent, not all group memberships are static, and which group identities are 
salient is highly context dependent (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). 
We therefore focus our attention on research examining (1) how the basic concepts of “us” 
and “them” are represented in the mind and brain and (2) the factors that drive people to flexibly 
update these representations: social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), 
cooperation (Deutsch, 1949), and competition (Sherif et al., 1961). Building on these classic 
perspectives, we emphasize the processes by which social groups are defined (e.g., self-
categorization, common fate) as well as the forces that intensify group identities and intergroup 
conflict (shared versus competing goals, status threat). We argue that focusing on these 
elemental features, rather than specific, static social groups in isolation, will help to resolve 
seemingly discrepant findings in the emerging literature, generate novel hypotheses, and offer a 
more general framework for understanding the neuroscience of intergroup relations.  
Overview 
In order to integrate major theories of intergroup relations with research on the neural 
systems implicated in maintaining and updating our representations of in-group and out-group 
members, we examine how these representations affect fundamental psychological processes 
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including perception, emotion, motivation, and decision-making, as well as subsequent behavior. 
We also review some of the scientific advantages of assigning people to novel groups (Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) and manipulating group features and intergroup dynamics. To 
illustrate the utility of this approach, we highlight occasions on which studying intergroup 
phenomena in the context of novel groups has incited a revision of existing psychological and 
neuroscience theories. Our hope is that this approach can better account for findings across 
multiple contexts and levels of analysis.  
We begin by reviewing the influence of social identity and self-categorization on the 
biological bases of group formation and evaluation. We describe how people move from 
categorizing themselves as individuals to identifying with a group and representing others as “us” 
versus “them.” We then review the social forces that unite and divide groups, with a specific 
emphasis on functional relations between groups, relative group status, and the effects of these 
dynamics on empathy and social behavior (i.e., help, harm). Finally, we outline an agenda for 
future research to address gaps in this growing area of inquiry and to foster greater collaboration 
between psychologists and neuroscientists.  
REPRESENTING “US” AND “THEM” 
Psychologists have long conceded that prejudice may be an inevitable aspect of human 
life (Allport, 1954). Categorizing people into social groups—termed social categorization—
allows us to simplify the social world and generalize our existing knowledge about certain 
groups and new people (Bruner, 1957). Although social categorization serves an important 
cognitive function, it can also lead to the activation and application of inaccurate stereotypes and 
prejudices, unless people are able to individuate specific social targets (Brewer 1988; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990). As many models of person perception posit, this problem is magnified by the 
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fact that the process of categorizing others according to their age, gender, or race can be reflexive 
and difficult to override (Brewer, 1988; Devine, 1989; Ito & Urland, 2005; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). To help understand how people 
perceive and evaluate targets from different social categories, scientists have used neuroimaging 
and other psychophysiological methods to examine how social categories are represented, 
evaluated, and integrated with ongoing psychological processes (see Amodio, 2008; 
Cunningham & Van Bavel, 2009; Eberhardt, 2005; Ito & Barthalow, 2009; Kubota et al., 2012; 
Phelps & Thomas, 2003; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). 
This relatively recent application of neuroscience to the study of social categorization has 
already provided important insights into the specific component processes that underlie 
intergroup categorization (e.g., Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001), evaluation (e.g., 
Phelps et al., 2000), and motivation (e.g., Amodio et al., 2004), and illuminated the time course 
of intergroup processing (e.g., Cunningham, Van Bavel, Arbuckle, Packer, & Waggoner, 2012; 
Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). Social group memberships do indeed impact neural processes 
automatically and unconsciously and these processes have important implications for 
discriminatory behavior (Cunningham et al., 2004). 
Most research that has examined the neural bases of social categorization has focused on 
static social groups and categories, such as race, rendering the findings ecologically valid, but 
inferences about the underlying process difficult to generalize. Differences in the groups, context, 
and the experimental method have often produced inconsistent results. These inconsistencies 
reflect the fact that race and other social categories are confounded with a variety of factors that 
might affect neural responses. For instance, participants in previous neuroimaging studies of 
social categorization often have strong associations with existing social groups, introducing the 
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possibility that factors ranging from low-level visual features of stimuli (e.g., luminance and 
contrast) to novelty, or exposure to stereotypes, can account for differences in neural responses 
to same versus specific other-race targets. Furthermore, most studies examine how majority 
group members respond to minority group members; relatively few have directly compared the 
responses of members of different racial groups to same versus other-race targets within a single 
study (c.f., Hart et al., 2001; Golby et al, 2001; Lieberman et al., 2005).  
In this section, we introduce a different approach to studying the biological bases of 
group processes. We review self-categorization and social identity theory to explain how people 
develop and maintain representations of “us” and “them,” in the real world and in the laboratory. 
We then contrast early findings from intergroup neuroscience research (using existing social 
groups) against more recent findings, which have generated significant re-interpretation of earlier 
results by incorporating novel groups and classic theories of intergroup relations. We believe this 
approach complements research with existing social groups by emphasizing the context-
dependent nature of social identity representation and identifying organizational principles for 
understanding the core elements of group formation and evaluation. 
Self-categorization, social identity, and minimal groups 
There is no doubt that certain social categories, such as age, gender, and race, play a 
major role in shaping neural responses as well as the biases and stereotypes that people bring to 
bear on their social judgments and behavior. However, work on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) has argued that how people 
categorize themselves as members of a group is also fundamental to understanding intergroup 
relations. Tajfel and Turner conceptualized a group as “a collection of individuals who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this 
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common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the 
evaluation of their group and their membership of it” (1979, p. 40). From this perspective, 
aggregates of individuals become meaningful social groups by virtue of the fact that the 
members choose to identify with groups and their other members (see Sherif, 1967). 
When people categorize themselves as part of a group or coalition, their self-concept 
shifts from the individual (“I” or “me”) to the collective level (“us” or “we”)—a process termed 
social identification (Brewer, 1996). Social identities represent individuals’ knowledge that they 
belong to certain groups, along with the psychological significance of these groups, their 
relationship to these groups and group-members, and the associations they have with these 
groups (Tajfel, 1982). As such, they fulfill a number of basic human motives, including 
belonging (Brewer, 1991), self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and certainty (Hogg, 2000) 
needs.  
The act of categorizing one’s self as a group member has a significant influence on 
intergroup perception, evaluation, and behaviors (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; 
Otten & Wentura, 1999; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009, 2011). The nature of the effects 
depends on which social identity is made salient, which is determined in large part by the social 
context. Social identities become more inclusive as the context makes more abstract identities 
salient (e.g., shifting from local to national to global identities), leading to the inclusion of others 
who would otherwise be deemed as distinct from the self (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 
1989; Turner et al., 1994). On the other hand, the social context can heighten the accessibility of 
a more specific social identity (e.g., university affiliation, sports team allegiance, etc.), which in 
turn elicits perceptions and evaluations consistent with the activated aspects of this identity. 
Specific identities can become integrated with the representation of one’s self (Smith & Henry, 
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1996), especially among people who strongly identify with the in-group (Brewer & Pickett, 
1999). Identification with specific groups may even override automatic responses to orthogonal 
categories like race (Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009). In other words, when people identify 
with a group, their in-group members may be seen as valuable regardless of their race or other 
seemingly important category memberships. 
One important consequence of the social identification process is that humans reliably 
divide the world into us and everyone else: them. The mere act of categorizing people into 
groups has profound implications for intergroup preferences (Brewer, 1979). Group membership 
matters because it reliably predicts intergroup bias: prejudice and discriminatory behavior that 
favors the in-group relative to an out-group (Hewstone et al., 2002). Perhaps most fascinating is 
that individuals construct intergroup boundaries and discriminate in favor of in-group members 
in the absence of any factors typically posited to account for intergroup bias. 
Creating “us” and “them” in the laboratory: The minimal group paradigm. The ease 
with which one can generate intergroup bias is best illustrated by the minimal group paradigm 
(Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). In these studies, people are told they are assigned to minimal 
groups on the basis of arbitrary group differences, such as a preference for abstract art or dot 
estimation abilities (in fact they are randomly assigned). Once they are assigned to groups, 
participant typically have no face-to-face interaction within or between groups, which prevents 
any sense of competition or the potential for stereotype activation. Remarkably, randomly 
assigning participants to minimal groups (even when participants know one another prior to the 
study) produces discrimination in favor of in-group members. These findings underscore how 
readily people identify with social groups as well as the context-dependent nature of these 
identities.  
The neuroscience of intergroup relations 	 11	
Creating novel groups is a powerful tool for intergroup neuroscience research because it 
can be used to isolate the effects of social identification processes: (1) participants do not have 
any pre-existing stereotypes or associations regarding the in-group and out-group prior to group 
assignment, (2) theoretically irrelevant group features (e.g., majority/minority status, power, 
familiarity) can be matched between groups, (3) theoretically relevant group features (e.g. 
current threat, perceived cohesion) can be effectively and ethically manipulated between groups, 
(4) there is a natural mechanism for creating neutral targets who are not associated with either 
group to help differentiate in-group favoritism from out-group derogation (e.g., Van Bavel et al., 
2011), and (5) individuals can be randomly assigned and then reassigned to groups, allowing 
researchers to examine the flexibility of self-categorization processes (e.g., Cikara et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, novel groups are easy to implement in the lab (e.g., easier than collecting equal 
numbers of ethnic minority and majority participants). Finally, in our experience, most 
participants take to their identities quickly and maintain them until another identity becomes 
salient.  
Neural responses to “us” and “them” 
 Early results in the neuroscience of intergroup evaluation. The initial neuroimaging 
research on self and social categorization focused on the amygdala—a small structure in the 
temporal lobe (see Figure 1). The amygdala has been implicated in a host of social and affective 
processes, including fear conditioning and processing negative stimuli (for a review see Phelps, 
2006). Building on this work, several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of 
social categorization found that Black and White perceivers exhibited relatively greater 
amygdala activity when viewing other-race faces than own-race faces (Hart et al., 2000) and that 
individual differences in amygdala activity to other-race faces were correlated with implicit 
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measures of racial bias—including startle eye-blink and the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Phelps et al., 2000). These correlations with racial bias, coupled with 
studies demonstrating a link between the amygdala and fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1996), led 
some researchers to interpret differences in amygdala activity to other-race faces as evidence of 
negativity (including disgust and fear) toward stigmatized groups. 
Despite the robust relationship between the amygdala and negative stimuli, several 
studies have shown that the amygdala also responds to highly arousing stimuli more generally 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004) including positively arousing 
stimuli (Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999). As such, the amygdala may play a role in 
directing attention to any motivationally-relevant stimuli, regardless of valence (Cunningham & 
Brosch, 2012; Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008; Vuilleumier & Brosch, 2009). When 
race is the most salient social category—as is often the case in experiments where participants 
are presented with hundreds of black and white faces—the amygdala may indeed be responsive 
to members of groups that are novel (Dubois et al., 1999) or associated with threatening 
stereotypes or prejudice (Phelps et al., 2000). However, when race is not the most salient social 
category, the amygdala may be responsive to members of groups, who are motivationally 
relevant for other reasons (see Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2011).  
Re-interpreting findings from the neuroscience of intergroup evaluation. In minimal 
groups, in-group members tend to be motivationally relevant because they afford group members 
the opportunity to fulfill belonging needs and other core social motives; furthermore, minimal 
out-group members are not associated with any specific stereotypes (Hugenberg, Young, 
Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012; Van Bavel, Swencionis, O'Connor, 
& Cunningham, 2012). To test the hypothesis that the amygdala would respond more to a novel 
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in-group as compared to out-group members, one study randomly assigned White participants to 
a minimal mixed-race group, had them briefly learn the members of each group, and then 
presented them with in-group and out-group faces during functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI; Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 2008). Crossing race and group membership 
provided a clean investigation of the role of group membership in neural processing because it 
diminished differences between in-group and out-group members on familiarity, novelty, and 
other factors. Likewise, the novel groups had no pre-existing stereotypes and the images were 
counterbalanced to rule out any visual differences between in-group and out-group members. 
Whereas earlier studies had often interpreted amygdala activity to other races faces as 
reflecting negativity or fear, perceivers in this experiment had greater amygdala activity to 
members of their novel in-group. Specifically, people exhibited greater amygdala activity to in-
group than out-group faces. There was no main effect of race, nor was this pattern of in-group 
bias moderated by target race. Strikingly, this pattern of in-group bias in neural processing 
occurred within minutes of group assignment, in the absence of explicit team-based rewards or 
social interaction, and independent of pre-existing racial bias, stereotypes, or familiarity. This 
suggests that social identification with a group—even a seemingly trivial group—can guide 
neural responses to social targets. Subsequent studies confirmed that assigning people to mixed-
race teams can even override racial biases on relatively automatic measures of evaluation (i.e., 
evaluative priming task; see Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009) and that the effects of novel group 
membership can influence perceptual processes within the first few hundred milliseconds of 
perception (Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Van Bavel, Earls, Morris, & Cunningham, 2013) 
This research underscores the idea that the relevance of different social categories varies 
according to the immediate social context (Turner et al., 1987). In contexts where race provides 
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the most salient group distinction, racial attitudes, cultural stereotypes, and personal values (e.g., 
egalitarianism) may provide the most relevant frameworks for perception and action. Assigning 
people to mixed-race groups, on the other hand, may change the way people construe race and 
other social categories and sensitize perceptual and evaluative processes to other contextually 
relevant group memberships (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). Subsequent work has 
examined the influence of these contextually determined social identities on basic face 
processing and social memory.  
Perceiving “us” and “them.” For nearly a century, scientists have known that people are 
better at recognizing faces from their own racial or ethnic groups compared to faces from other 
racial groups (Feingold, 1914). This phenomenon, typically termed the own-race bias, has 
largely been explained in terms of experience with own-race faces (i.e., people have a lifetime of 
experience identifying members of their own race; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Sporer, 2001). For 
instance, one influential neuroimaging study found that Black and White participants showed 
heightened activity in the Fusiform Face Area (FFA) to own-race relative to other-race faces 
(Golby et al., 2001). The FFA—a face sensitive sub-region of the fusiform gyri (see Figure 1)— 
plays an important role in processing and individuating faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 
1997; Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004) and perceptual expertise (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, 
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Participants with the strongest FFA activity to own-race (relative to 
other-race) faces also displayed the greatest own-race bias on a subsequent recognition memory 
task, leading the authors to suggest that own-race biases in fusiform activity may have been due 
to superior perceptual expertise with own-race faces (Golby et al., 2001; see also Feng et al., 
2011).  
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Although studies have shown that life-long experience with own-race faces is associated 
with own-race bias (Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & de Schonen, 2005), interracial 
contact (a proxy for expertise) only explains 2% of the own-race bias effect (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). As a result, researchers have sought alternative theoretical frameworks to 
explain own-race bias. Sporer (2001) and others have argued that categorizing others as own-
group versus other-group members may alter the depth or type of processing the targets receive, 
such that own-race faces are processed as individuals (encoded at a subordinate level) and other-
race faces are processed as interchangeable representatives of a social category (encoded at a 
superordinate level; see also Hugenberg et al., 2010; Levin, 1996, 2000). Indeed, the own-race 
bias has been replicated across a variety of non-racial social categories, including minimal 
groups, demonstrating that mere categorization with a group can enhance the recognition of in-
group relative to out-group faces, even when prior exposure to in-group and out-group members 
is equivalent (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012). This 
suggests that social identity may also motivate enhanced encoding of in-group members’ faces. 
Building on this work, Van Bavel and colleagues (2008; 2011) examined whether 
members of novel groups would encode in-group members at an individuated, subordinate level 
and out-group members at a categorical, superordinate level. Specifically, they predicted that 
deeper encoding of in-group members would be reflected in differences in fusiform activity for 
in-group compared to out-group members, despite similar exposure to members of both groups. 
Given the role of the fusiform gyrus—especially the FFA—in perceptual expertise, White 
participants might have been expected to show greater fusiform activity to own-race relative to 
other-race faces. However, given the role of the fusiform in individuation (see Kanwisher et al, 
1997; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000), the authors expected that participants would show greater 
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fusiform activity to in-group relative to out-group faces, regardless of race. Consistent with the 
latter hypothesis, participants exhibited greater activation within the bi-lateral fusiform gyri for 
in-group than out-group faces (Van Bavel et al., 2008). Importantly, there was no main effect of 
race nor was this pattern of in-group bias moderated by race (see also Hehman, Maniab, & 
Gaertner, 2010; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012).These results provided evidence that the 
fusiform may be sensitive to shifts in self-categorization, individuating faces imbued with 
psychological significance by virtue of their group membership . 
Subsequent research has linked this pattern of in-group bias directly to behavior. In a 
follow-up experiment, the same authors examined the FFA specifically, using a face-localizer 
task. They not only replicated the pattern of in-group bias reported above, but they also found 
that FFA activity mediated the effects of group membership on recognition memory—a 
behavioral index of individuation. Specifically, there was a positive correlation between the 
individual differences in FFA activity to in-group versus out-group faces and recognition 
memory differences for in-group versus out-group faces (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 
2011). Similarly, several electroencephalography (EEG) papers have found that novel group 
membership can influence very early components of face processing (i.e., within the first few 
hundred milliseconds). For instance, a recent paper found that people have greater N170 
responses—an event-related potential implicated in facial identity encoding—to minimal in-
group than out-group faces (Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Other work suggests that in-group 
members are perceived faster than out-group members (Zheng & Segalowitz, 2013) and that 
these group affiliations can override initial racial biases in perceptual processing (Van Bavel et 
al., 2013). Taken together, these findings imply that once people identify with a group, in-group 
members are more likely to be processed as individuals in a non-categorical fashion than out-
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group members, consistent with social cognitive models of person perception. However, the time 
course of these signals suggests that motivational concerns may influence face processing earlier 
than many social cognitive models suggest. 
Consistent with these findings, recent research suggests that social memory is also 
sensitive to social identity (see Hugenberg et al., 2010 for a review). Importantly, the 
motivational aspects of the perceiver’s social identity shape social attention and memory over 
and above mere categorization into groups (Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012; Van Bavel et al., 
2012). For instance, people, who have a high need to belong or who are highly identified with 
their in-group appear to have the largest memory advantage for in-group versus out-group faces. 
However, social roles can attenuate in-group bias: for example, memory for out-group faces was 
heightened among participants who were assigned to be a “spy,” a role that required greater 
attention toward out-group members. This research suggests that many aspects of social 
identity—from collective identification to specific social roles—are responsible for shaping 
social perception and memory.  
More generally, there is evidence that the influence of social identity extends far beyond 
face perception. Confirming the experience of countless sports fans, one classic paper found that 
students from two different universities had very different perceptions of the same football game, 
recalling different “facts” about the game (e.g., irrespective of team allegiance, fans recalled with 
great certainty that the other team had played dirty; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). A related, recent 
neuroimaging paper found evidence that groups might indeed bias basic perceptual processing of 
in-group versus out-group targets’ actions (Molenberghs, Halazs, Mattingly, Vanman, & 
Cunnington, 2013). The authors randomly assigned participants to the red team or blue team and 
had them judge the speed of hand movements performed by both in-group and out-group 
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members. Participants judged the actions of in-group members as faster than the identical actions 
of out-group members; this intergroup bias was associated with activity in the left inferior 
parietal lobule—a region that has previously been implicated in transforming visual 
representations of actions to the motor system for action (see Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This work converges with several recent behavioral studies 
suggesting that group allegiances can play a role in structuring basic perceptions of the social 
and physical world (Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009; Xiao & Van Bavel, 2012; Young, Ratner, 
& Fazio, 2013). 
Effects of “us” and “them” on higher-order social cognition. It is important to note that 
differences between processing in-group and out-group targets are not confined to perceptual and 
evaluative processes. Higher order social cognition also appears to be sensitive to social identity 
concerns: for example, people are more accurate when inferring the mental states of own-race 
relative to other-race targets (Adams et al., 2010). Building on the hypothesis that “we” is 
represented similarly as “I”, several neuroimaging studies have attempted to identify an overlap 
between the brain regions implicated in self-referential processing, such as the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC adjacent to the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex; Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell, 
2009; see Figure 1), and representation of in-group members. For instance, people assigned to a 
minimal group showed greater activation in the dorsal mPFC when they had to choose between 
allocating points to an in-group versus out-group member (as opposed to two in-group or two 
out-group members); this activation was correlated with in-group bias (i.e., awarding more 
points to in-group than out-group players; Volz et al., 2009). Other research has found that in-
group relative to out-group labels of both real social groups (e.g., “male”, “Australian”) 
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(Morrison et al., 2012) and novel groups (e.g., Red Team vs. Blue team; Molenberghs & 
Morrison, 2012) were associated with greater activation in the mPFC.  
Although the regions reported in these papers are more dorsal than the region of mPFC 
that is usually associated with self-referential processing (e.g., Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 
2012; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011), these findings led the authors to infer that social and personal 
identity processes draw on overlapping neural substrates (see also Scheepers et al., 2013). It is 
important to keep in mind that the “self” is not a static representation stored in an isolated region 
of the brain, but rather an online construction derived from contextually determined patterns of 
activation across networks involving many different regions of the brain (Smith, Coats, & 
Walling, 1999). As such, social identities and specific group memberships also involve dynamic 
construction of collective self-representation (Aron et al., 1991; Packer & Van Bavel, 2013; 
Turner et al., 1987). 
Summary 
Taken together, these studies support the notion that social identification involves a 
highly flexible shift in self-representation from the personal to the collective and that this shift 
can override the influence of visually salient social categories on perception, evaluation, and 
other aspects of cognition. One important implication is that many social categories are poor 
proxies for group membership because they are associated with a host of other variables. This 
research marks the initial phase of work on novel groups in social neuroscience and future work 
will likely continue to revise existing theories of the neural bases of social categorization and 
intergroup relations. It is important to note, however, that work with novel groups should 
complement, rather than replace, work with existing social groups (e.g., race-based categories). 
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Intergroup relations are complex and inviting a synthesis of both perspectives likely offers the 
greatest hope for understanding and attenuating intergroup conflict. 
FORCES THAT UNITE AND DIVIDE “US” AND “THEM” 
An integrative theory of intergroup relations must appreciate not only that group 
membership is flexible and highly context dependent, but also that not all out-groups are 
equivalent. People today encounter a far greater number and variety of out-group members than 
their ancestors; however, the fundamental questions that govern social interactions remain the 
same. Whenever we encounter a novel person or group we are motivated to answer two 
questions as quickly as possible: the first is “friend or foe?”; the second is “is this agent capable 
of enacting their intentions toward me?” Specifically, functional relations between groups—are 
your goals concordant, discordant, or entirely independent of ours?—and status—do you have 
access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions (Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Xu, & Glick, 2002). As such, one 
alternative to studying intergroup relations with existing social groups and categories is to 
manipulate these structural variables among novel groups. The primary strength of this approach 
is that it provides experimental control over confounding factors and allows for more precise 
inferences about the underlying causal nature of different aspects of the intergroup context. 
Accordingly, insights from this approach should have greater generalizability across intergroup 
contexts and may allow for greater specification for potential interventions (see Billig, 1976). 
Here we review the effects of functional relations (i.e., cooperation, competition) and relative 
group status on the neural bases of intergroup interactions. We then explore some of the effects 
of these structural variables on intergroup interactions, including effects on empathy, help, and 
harm between groups.  
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The role of functional relations in intergroup dynamics 
Extensive evidence suggests that random assignment to minimal groups can elicit 
intergroup bias—even in the absence of intergroup hostility. Beyond mere group membership, 
one key amplifier of intergroup bias is the perception of a zero-sum relationship between the 
respective groups’ goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; see also Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Even in the 
absence of actual competition, the mere perception of groups as competitive engenders negative 
emotions toward them (Fiske et al., 2002). Making competition explicit increases intergroup 
hostility in part because it makes social identity more salient (Hogg, 1992, 1993; Mullen, Brown, 
& Smith, 1992). For all these reasons, competitive functional relations increase intergroup 
conflict and out-group derogation (Deutsch, 2006; Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Sherif 1961).  
In addition to the flexibility of social identification with groups (Turner et al., 1994), the 
functional relations between groups (and the consequences thereof) are also malleable 
(Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, Sherif, 1954/1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Groups that have 
previously had cordial relations may become competitive. The fluid nature of functional relations 
between groups, however, is also reason to be optimistic about interventions in intergroup 
conflicts: if perceptions or the salience of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may 
overcome hostility toward previous enemies (Sherif et al., 1961), even when in the context of 
socially meaningful identities that are linked to deeply held political beliefs, gender, or race. For 
example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary 
Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money in a dictator game to strangers who 
supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after 
the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the 
party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared (Rand et al., 2009). Along with the 
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findings that novel teams can override race categorization (e.g., Kurzban et al., 2001; Van Bavel 
& Cunningham, 2011), these findings fit well with decades of research on common in-group 
identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Sherif et al., 1961). The moment-to-moment motivational 
salience of specific functional relations can modulate attitudes, emotions, and behaviors.  
Surprisingly, very little research has explored the biological bases of intergroup 
competition and cooperation as well as group-based social status inference. In the sections that 
follow, we review the relevant literature and include some of the recent work on these topics in 
the context of interpersonal interactions as the basis for generating novel hypotheses about these 
processes at the group level.  
The neuroscience of competition and cooperation  
The last decade has seen an explosion of research examining the neural substrates of 
cooperation and competition between individuals (see Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). By some 
accounts, people cooperate because it is inherently rewarding (Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). For 
example, in one study, playing a game with another person in both cooperative and competitive 
contexts (relative to playing alone) recruited the frontoparietal network, which is associated with 
executive control (e.g., Vincent et al., 2008); however, when the two social interaction 
conditions were contrasted against one another, cooperation, relative to competition, elicited a 
relatively greater response in orbitofrontal cortex (among other regions), which the authors 
interpreted as reflecting a reward response (Decety, Jackson, Sommerville, Chaminade, & 
Meltzoff, 2004). Several other studies support the cooperation-as-reward theory: for example, 
ventral striatum (also associated with reward registration in the service of optimizing future 
behavior) responds when individuals observe cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002) and fair resource 
distribution (Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, & O’Doherty, 2010), as well as when individuals choose 
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to act equitably (Zaki & Mitchell, 2011). However, the same neural mechanisms associated with 
cooperative behavior are also associated with anti-social responses in competitive contexts. 
People experience pleasure when they have the ability to punish, or watch the punishment 
of a disliked or competitive other. When a partner behaved unfairly (i.e., defected) in a game, the 
dorsal striatum—a region implicated in action selection on the basis of reward value—was 
relatively more active when people administered punishments that reduced defectors’ payoffs, as 
compared to punishments that did not (De Quervain et al., 2004). Moreover, subjects with 
stronger activations in the dorsal striatum were willing to incur greater costs in order to punish. 
Other work has found that seeing the pain of a cooperative confederate activated a network of 
brain regions associated with first-hand experience of pain; however, seeing the pain of a 
competitive confederate activated ventral striatum. Further, ventral striatum activation correlated 
with an expressed desire for revenge (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 
2006). Thus in interpersonal contexts, competition (even among strangers, for low-stakes 
outcomes) fundamentally changes people’s social preferences and corresponding neural 
responses.  
One open question is how moving from an interpersonal to intergroup context affects 
these processes. Is observing out-group punishment or failure rewarding in competitive 
intergroup interactions? Perhaps even more so than in interpersonal contexts. There are several 
reasons to think interpersonal and intergroup processes will manifest differently in degree, and 
possibly in kind. People trust groups less than individuals and expect interactions with groups to 
be more hostile than person-to-person interactions (Bornstein & Ben-Youssef, 1994; Insko & 
Schopler, 1998; Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1996; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & 
Schopler, 2003). In competitive contexts, people cooperate less with out-groups relative to 
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individual competitors (Insko, Wildschut, & Cohen, 2013) and behave more aggressively (e.g., 
Gotte, Huffman, Meier, & Sutter, 2012; Hugh-Jones & Leroch, 2011; Meier & Hinsz, 2004; 
Wildschut et al., 2003). Relative to interpersonal contexts, people seem to abandon their 
preferences for equity and disdain for harming others to an even greater extent when “we” are 
competitive with “them” (Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006).  
These findings suggest that the biological bases of social preferences may manifest 
differently in the context of intergroup interactions (particularly competitive interactions) 
because the expectations and attributions are fundamentally different. For example, as we noted 
above, several papers have illustrated that participants show increased activity in dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) when thinking the mental states of other individuals (Mitchell, 2009). 
Activation in this region is higher in response to in-group relative to out-group targets, both 
existing and novel, in the absence of overt competition (Mitchell et al., 2006; Molenberghs & 
Morrison, 2013; Rilling et al., 2008). These results dovetail nicely with the finding that people 
engage less in spontaneous mentalizing for extreme out-group members (Harris & Fiske, 2006, 
2009). Putting people in competitive intergroup contexts, on the other hand, may show the exact 
opposite pattern. In competitive or threatening contexts, out-group members, by virtue of the fact 
that they are more likely to arouse suspicion, may elicit even larger responses in regions 
associated with mentalizing than in-group members (see Hackel, Looser, Van Bavel, 2013). One 
possible explanation of this discrepancy is that the minimal group context specifically facilitates 
in-group preference without any out-group derogation (Brewer 1999; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 
2004), whereas an overtly competitive context, in which out-group members’ actions are more 
motivationally relevant (see Ackerman et al., 2006), might increase consideration of out-group 
members’ mental states—especially their agentic capacity. This hypothesized pattern is reflected 
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in recent research which reports that people exhibited greater motor resonance, indexed by mu-
suppression in EEG recordings (an index of sensorimotor activity), with racial in-group members 
(relative to out-group members) when the targets made benign gestures; however, the pattern 
was reversed when targets made offensive gestures (i.e., “giving someone the finger;” Gutsell & 
Inzlicht, 2013). Thus, people exhibited greater motor resonance with out-group members when 
those targets became threatening. Related, recent evidence suggests that the emotional suffering 
of a threatening out-group member not only elicits as much activity in mentalizing regions as in-
group suffering does, but also more activity than neutral out-group suffering (Bruneau, Dufour, 
& Saxe, 2012). Processes ranging from motor resonance to empathy for emotional suffering can 
be brought on-line when out-groups pose an active threat. 
Recent work in an intergroup context using different relational structures has also 
revealed new insights about oxytocin—a hormone that acts as a neuromodulator in the brain.	
Interest in the effects of oxytocin on human behavior has boomed in the last decade, with several 
researchers and media outlets referring to it as the “love hormone” because of its role in 
facilitating social affiliation and pro-social behavior (Bartz & Hollander, 2006). However the 
effects of oxytocin are inconsistent and highly context-dependent (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger, & 
Ochsner, 2011). Rather than promoting universal other-concern and affiliation, once people are 
divided into groups (both ethnic and arbitrary groups), oxytocin administration yields greater in-
group favoritism relative to a placebo. Specifically, people exhibit greater positive associations 
with their in-group and contribute more resources to an in-group pool in an intergroup prisoner’s 
dilemma game (De Dreu et al., 2010; De Dreu, Greer, Van Kleef, Shalvi, & Handgraaf, 2011). 
However, there is no difference between people who receive oxytocin and controls with regard 
to negative associations with the out-group or contribution of resources to an “out-group harm” 
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pool. Together these findings indicate that oxytocin administration selectively enhances in-group 
love, but does not engender out-group derogation (Brewer, 1999). 
Subsequent research has examined the effects of oxytocin when the out-group represents 
an active threat. When the payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma game were structured so that the 
out-group had the potential to hurt the in-group, participants who received oxytocin were more 
likely to defect on behalf of their in-group. Self-report data revealed that oxytocin recipients 
engaged in these “preemptive strikes” against the out-group, not because they thought out-group 
defection was more likely, but because they wanted to minimize harm to the in-group (see also 
De Dreu, Shalvi, Greer, Van Kleef, & Handgraaf, 2012). Thus, by some accounts, oxytocin’s 
facilitation of this response is largely parochial, leading to in-group favoritism and ethnocentric 
behavior (De Dreu, 2012). On the other hand, a recent study reports that administration of 
oxytocin increased Israeli Jewish participants’ empathy for individuated Palestinian targets’ pain 
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2013); this finding supports the hypothesis that oxytocin heightens the 
salience of social information (Henrichs, von Dawans, & Domes, 2009), which may increase 
pro-social responses towards identifiable victims, even if they are members of an out-group 
(Chen, Kumsta, & Heinrichs, 2011). These findings clearly indicate that we need to conduct 
further research to understand the circumstances under which oxytocin exacerbates versus 
reduces intergroup prejudice and conflict. 	
More recent research has started to investigate the neuroendocrine substrates, specifically, 
of overt out-group aggression. Building on findings demonstrating that human and many other 
non-human vertebrate males exhibit increases in testosterone—a steroid hormone—in 
anticipation of fighting another male (Gladue et al., 1989; Hirschenhauser & Oliveira 2006; 
Salvador, 2005; Wingfield et al., 1990; Wobber et al., 2010), a recent study investigated whether 
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testosterone levels after competition were modulated by the participant’s relationship with the 
competitor. In the community of Bwa Mawego, Dominica, men who defeated an out-group team 
member in a game of dominos exhibited significant increases in testosterone, whereas men who 
beat their friends did not (Flinn, Ponzi, & Muehlenbein, 2012). Without studying these hormones 
in intergroup contexts—specifically competitive and cooperative contexts—researchers would 
not have revealed the parochial nature of the neuroendocrine processes that underlie fundamental 
help and harm behavioral tendencies. This is yet another example of how the study of intergroup 
relations can provide important contributions to our understanding of basic biological processes. 
The role of status in intergroup dynamics 
 Once the question, “friend or foe?” is answered, people want to know to what extent that 
group is capable of enacting their intentions. Status refers to one’s position in a social hierarchy; 
those higher in the hierarchy have greater access to resources, which can make them a more or 
less credible threat (Fiske, 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). As such, individual and group 
survival is contingent on members’ abilities to infer others’ social status and protect or better 
their own status. These inferences help to “optimize” group behavior (e.g., groups are better able 
to avoid engaging dominant groups in contests they are sure to lose).  
Given the centrality of status to intergroup dynamics, it is not surprising that sensitivity to 
dominant and submissive cues are present in infancy (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & 
Carey, 2011), and that by the time humans are adults, status inference are reflexive and 
ubiquitous—even between groups (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Jost & Banaji 1994). Status 
inference is supported, in part, by social comparison (comparing oneself against others in order 
to determine one’s standing), which occurs across human societies (Festinger, 1954; Fiske, 2011; 
Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Social comparisons about status happen 
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quickly, consume few cognitive resources, and can occur outside of subjects’ control (Gilbert, 
Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995; Wedell, 1994). Indeed, evidence from 
EEG studies suggests that inferences of social status from facial cues occur within 170 ms 
(Chiao et al., 2008). Whether or not we intend it, we register others’ social status immediately. 
The trouble with automatic status comparisons is that they often highlight one’s own (or 
one’s group’s) relatively lower-status, which can have negative cognitive and affective 
consequences (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) and induce 
stress, which has negative health implications over the long-term (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). 
Conditions are not entirely rosy for groups with high-status either. Competitive, high-status 
social groups elicit emotions like envy, which attracts punishment and aggression, both overt and 
subtle (Cuddy et al., 2007). For example, women who occupy high-power positions in the 
workplace are frequently targets of backlash (e.g., hiring discrimination, harsher appraisals, and 
sabotage; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). In general, targets that are seen as high-status are also 
perceived as being capable of defending themselves, so it seems more acceptable to harm them 
(Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Glick, 2002). 
The neuroscience of social status inference  
Understanding the biological bases of social status inference is important for several 
reasons, not least of which is because status is a fundamental feature of our social lives that has 
implications for our happiness and well-being, and also intergroup conflict (Fiske, 2012). 
Neuroimaging studies document a reliable network of brain regions associated with social status 
inference, including the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; for review, see Chiao, 2010). The IPL is 
associated with the representation of scalar magnitudes, thus its role in social status inference 
makes sense: people track rank like they track higher versus lower numerical values (Chiao et al., 
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2009). As we have already reviewed, however, social status inference is not a cold, cognitive 
process; people have associated affective and motivational responses because social status is 
imbued with value. Accordingly, viewing higher-ranked compared to lower-ranked individuals 
(relative to oneself) is associated with greater responses in the ventral striatum, which, again, is 
associated with the salience and registration of rewarding stimuli (Zink et al., 2008). One of the 
nicest features of these studies is that the researchers manipulated status rather than just 
measuring it. It is worth noting, however, that follow-up studies revealed that these effects are 
moderated by participants’ own socio-economic status (SES). Individuals with lower SES 
actually showed a greater ventral striatum response to lower-status targets, whereas individuals 
with higher SES replicated the original finding (Ly, Haynes, Barter, Weinberger, Zink, 2011). 
This is not surprising in light of the fact that low and high status groups have divergent goals. 
Low status groups are motivated to improve their standing, whereas high status groups are driven 
to defend their position in the hierarchy; as such, groups of differing status respond differently, 
especially to threat (Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2011; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
2002).  
The stability of the hierarchy also plays an important role. When relations are stable, low-
status group membership (even among arbitrary groups) is associated with cardiovascular indices 
of threat (i.e., higher blood pressure, lower cardiac output, higher total peripheral resistance); 
however, when hierarchies are seen as unstable, low-status is associated with a challenge 
response, and the high-status group members exhibit threat responses instead (Scheepers & 
Ellemers, 2005; Scheepers, 2009). Experimental manipulations of stability have revealed that 
people who operate in an unstable hierarchy exhibit greater activation in the amygdala and 
mPFC in response to pictures of higher-status individuals, which the authors interpret as 
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increased status-related reactivity (Zink et al., 2008). Though most hierarchies that affect our 
day-to-day lives are quite stable (i.e., SES), these studies suggest that changing perceptions about 
the stability of a given hierarchy may mitigate the stress response that plagues low-status groups.  
Implications for empathy, helping, and harm 
Understanding how people represent and process intergroup functional relations and 
group status are paramount for understanding downstream phenomena such as empathy, help, 
and harm. Empathy has received a great deal of attention from social and developmental 
psychologists, and cognitive neuroscience as of late (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). “Empathy” 
as a construct has been used to refer to several distinct, but interrelated processes (Batson, 2009 
in Decety & Ickes, 2009): knowing/feeling what another person is feeling; experiencing 
compassion in response to another person's distress; feeling motivated to help or improve 
another’s welfare, and so on. Because it promotes pro-social behavior, empathy is an integral 
element of human experience. Despite its centrality to social life and early emergence in 
development (Preston & DeWaal, 2002), empathy is not a universal response. Instead, apathy 
and antipathy, rather than empathy, are common responses when the target belongs to an out-
group. 
Most of the extant research explores intergroup empathy bias in the context of existing 
social and cultural groups (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Decety, Echols, & Correll, 2009; Johnson et 
al., 2002). Behavioral and neuroscience studies both find that people show decreased, and 
sometimes absent empathic responses when witnessing a racial out-group relative to an in-group 
member in physical and emotional pain. Even motor-simulation responses, which are theorized 
to support empathic responding via perception-action coupling, vary by target group membership 
(Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010). For example, Black and White participants show sensorimotor 
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resonance when an in-group member’s hand (even an artificially colored, purple hand) is pricked 
by a pin; however, this response is not just reduced, it is absent when the hand belongs to an out-
group member (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010). A convergent study reports that white 
participants exhibit comparable skin conductance responses—an index of automatic arousal—to 
images of White and Asian targets’ painful experiences, but significantly lower responses to 
Black targets’ painful experiences (Forgiarini, Galluci, & Maravita, 2011). Finally, a recent EEG 
study reports that participants’ patterns of neural responses when they feel sad are similar to 
those exhibited when they see an in-group, but not an out-group member, expressing sadness 
(Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012). Across these studies, people reliably exhibit decreased (if not absent) 
physiological traces of empathy, broadly defined. 
Interestingly, the fMRI research on intergroup empathy reveals a pattern of discrepant 
effects. Most of these studies have examined the influence of group membership on responses in 
the so-called ‘pain matrix’ or shared neural circuit for pain (Decety, 2011; Eres & Molenberghs, 
2013), which includes the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor area, and the 
insula (see Figure 1). In line with the studies described above, two fMRI studies report that the 
‘pain matrix’ was more responsive when participants viewed same-race faces (Xu, Zuo, Wang, 
& Han, 2009) and hands (Azevedo et al., 2012) relative to other race faces and hands being 
pricked with a needle. In another fMRI study, however, White participants’ responses in the 
‘pain matrix’ were equivalent for White and Black targets’ emotional suffering, whereas black 
participants showed an even greater response to Black relative to White targets’ suffering—a 
response that the authors termed “extraordinary empathy” (Mathur et al., 2010). In a third fMRI 
study, Israelis and Arabs reported feeling similar amounts of compassion for South American 
protagonists and protagonists from the in-group, but less compassion for members of the 
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threatening out-group (e.g., Israelis reported less compassion for Arab targets). However, 
responses in the ‘pain matrix’ were equivalent for in-group and threatening-out-group members, 
and decreased for South American targets (Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2012). Again, the lack of 
consistent effects across studies likely reflects the fact that race, ethnicity, and nationality co-
vary with multiple dimensions of intergroup context, including perceived competitiveness, social 
status, and majority/minority status—all of which could affect the intergroup empathy bias. 
Isolating and testing the effects of these dimensions independently will help reconcile these 
seemingly discrepant findings.  
A few studies have examined real-social groups that are defined almost uniquely by a 
competitive context—sports fans. Sports fans are interesting to study because sports is one of 
few domains in which it is acceptable to express overt antipathy toward out-group members. 
Unsurprisingly, sports fans are characterized by robust intergroup empathy bias, including both 
dampened empathy and overt counter-empathic responses (i.e., Schadenfreude; pleasure in 
response to rivals’ misfortunes). In one study, Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees fans—
archrival baseball teams—reported pleasure and exhibited activity in ventral striatum when 
watching rivals fail to score (even against a lower ranked team, the Baltimore Orioles; Cikara et 
al., 2011). These findings extend to individuals merely associated with the rival team: soccer 
fans exhibited activity in ventral striatum when watching a rival team’s fan receive a painful 
electric shock (Hein et al., 2010). Greater ventral striatum response to a rival’s suffering was 
associated with an increased desire to harm rival team fans (Cikara et al., 2011) and a decreased 
willingness to relieve a rival fan’s pain (by accepting a proportion of the pain for oneself, Hein et 
al., 2010). These behavioral responses illustrate the implications of group membership for pro- 
and anti-social behavior. 
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 Only one series of studies to date has focused on assessing the effects of competitiveness 
and status of stereotyped social groups on empathy and harm. Although these studies also 
employed existing social groups (e.g., homeless people, investment bankers, elderly targets), the 
analyses collapsed across the specific groups and analyzed the data using competitiveness and 
status as the predictors. In one study, participants read about positive and negative events 
befalling members of groups that were independently identified as high/low competitive and 
high/low status (yielding 4 types of targets). In the first study, participants reported that they felt 
least bad about negative events, and least good about positive events when they befell 
competitive, high-status group members as compared to other targets: participants did not, 
however, explicitly report feeling better (i.e., Schadenfreude) when negative events befell 
competitive, high-status group members as compared to other targets. Facial electromyography 
simultaneously recorded facial muscle responses, focusing on the zygomaticus major (the cheek 
muscle), because it correlates with positive affect (Brown & Schwartz, 1980) and indicates the 
presence of positive, and not just the absence of negative, affect. Participants exhibited the 
greatest zygomaticus responses (i.e., smiles) when negative events befell competitive, high-status 
group members relative to other targets (Cikara & Fiske, 2012). A follow-up fMRI study 
replicated the self-report data and further found that participants exhibited greater anterior insula 
activation in response to competitive, high-status group members’ good fortunes. One 
interpretation is that this insula activation represents a counter-empathic reaction (i.e., envy or 
resentment). In line with the findings from the Red Sox/Yankees fans study, this “counter-
empathic” response was correlated with a willingness to harm competitive, high-status targets 
(Cikara & Fiske, 2011).  
Summary  
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Once people have determined that someone is an out-group member, they need to 
determine what kind? Rather than examine how one or two different combinations of social 
groups represent and interact with one another, we suggest focusing on social structural 
variables—functional relations and status. The strength of this approach is that it isn’t restricted 
to specific targets; examining the effects of competitiveness and status allows for predictions 
about emotional and behavioral responses to any social group about which people harbor 
stereotypes. In addition to measuring these factors among existing social groups, future studies 
should manipulate functional relations and relative social status among novel groups in order to 
control for confounding factors. We believe that down the line this approach will allow for 
greater specification of potential targets for intervention.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
A central assumption of our approach is that organizing future research around classic 
theories (e.g., Social Identity, Self-Categorization Theory, Realistic Conflict Theory) and 
contemporary models of intergroup relations (e.g., Stereotype Content Model) with recent 
research on the neural systems underlying social cognition will move the field toward a more 
comprehensive theory of the neuroscience of intergroup processes. Although initial, exploratory 
research was necessary to establish empirical foundations for the field, the mere demonstration 
that some process or outcome changes depending on whether the target of that process is an in-
group or out-group member is only partially informative because most groups vary on many 
different dimensions. Therefore we recommend exercising caution against using existing social 
groups to make more general inferences about group processes.  
As we have already outlined, one way to investigate intergroup processes so that the 
results are more generalizable is to employ novel groups and manipulate the features of interest 
The neuroscience of intergroup relations 	 35	
(e.g., functional relations; relative status). Another approach is to examine many different in-
group versus out-group identities (e.g., race, nationality, religion) within a single experiment 
(Cikara & Fiske, 2011; Cikara & Fiske, 2012; Lewis & Bates, 2010; Morrison, Decety, & 
Molenberghs, 2012). If the process or outcome in question is fundamentally about “us” and 
“them” rather than any specific identity, the results should average out across groups. However 
the groups are instantiated, we believe this approach offers an important complement to the 
extant intergroup neuroscience literature on existing social groups and categories (e.g., Kubota et 
al., 2012). In particular, this approach will allow investigators to test how specific aspects of a 
person’s social identity and intergroup context shape the responses of his or her nervous system. 
In turn, they can study how neural, neuroendocrine, metabolic and immune systems dynamically 
influence specific social percepts, motivations, and behaviors (Cacioppo, Berntson, & Decety, 
2010). Here, we highlight several other areas of inquiry that we believe are ripe for investigation.  
Future directions in neuroscience 
Structural and functional connectivity. The research covered in this review documents the 
widely distributed network of brain regions involved in maintaining and updating our 
representations of “us” and “them.” To date, however, most of the research on intergroup 
neuroscience has focused on the effect of intergroup contexts on circumscribed brain regions 
(and individual hormones), in isolation from the systems in which they are embedded. This 
approach neglects the fact that each discrete region supports many psychological processes, and 
each psychological process engages a complex network of interconnected brain regions, the 
components of which have both excitatory and inhibitory effects on one another (see Phillips et 
al., 1984). It remains an open question whether the documented findings are better characterized 
as reflecting functionally discrete processes (e.g., face perception in the FFA) or integrated and 
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distributed processes mediated by anatomical connections (e.g., the extended face processing 
network; see Friston & Buchel, 2003, for discussion; Pyles, Verstynen, Schneider, & Tarr, 2013). 
As such, it is inappropriate to infer psychological processes from activation of isolated brain 
regions (Poldrack, 2006). This type of “reverse inference” does a disservice to the field because 
it engenders inappropriate speculation about the psychological mechanisms underlying 
intergroup cognitions, affect, and behavior (particularly when activation is considered in the 
absence of any convergent self-report or behavioral indices of said processes). 
We believe that an important future direction in the nascent field of intergroup 
neuroscience will be the examination of structural and functional connections between different 
brain regions. Examining connectivity is not only fundamental for understanding the 
psychological processes supported by specific patterns of activation, but also for shedding light 
on the interactions between processes that are central to many psychological models. For 
instance, social psychologists have exerted considerable effort trying to understand the 
relationship between automatic and controlled processing in the expression of racial bias (Devine, 
1989; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). Initial work in social neuroscience suggested 
that regions associated with cognitive control—including the lateral PFC—might play a role in 
inhibiting racial bias in regions such as the amygdala, promoting more egalitarian judgments and 
behavior (e.g., Amodio et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 2004; Richeson et al., 2003). Recent 
research has used functional connectivity to provide a more direct assessment of the relationship 
between the amygdala and the latereal PFC during the perception of Black and White faces 
(Forbes et al., 2012). As expected, activity in the amygdala was negatively correlated with 
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and lateral PFC, suggesting that regions associated with 
control have been recruited to suppress responses associated with racial bias. However, this 
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pattern was reversed when participants were exposed to violent rap music, suggesting that 
controlled processes may also be recruited to increase gain in—or even up-regulate (Ochsner et 
al., 2004)—racial bias in certain contexts (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). This research 
highlights the potential value for using functional connectivity to test and develop process 
models of intergroup relations. 
The effects of individual differences in anatomy on intergroup bias have also garnered 
increasing interest as of late. For example, individual differences in biological structure (i.e., 
decreased grey matter volume in dorsal mPFC) are associated with increased intergroup bias 
(Baumgartner, Schiller, Hill, & Knoch, 2013). Future research could examine how individual 
differences in white matter microstructural integrity—particularly of pathways within 
hypothetically relevant networks—relate to representation of in-group and out-group boundaries 
and relations. The growing popularity of neuroimaging techniques that visualize the anatomical 
connections between different parts of the brain (e.g., diffusion tensor imaging) will likely 
promote a greater appreciation of the role of structural networks in intergroup relations. 
Networks of brain regions. Shifting the focus from isolated brain regions to collections of 
functionally and/or anatomically connected brain regions should also generate greater interest in 
well-established networks that are likely engaged in intergroup cognition and behavior. The 
reverse-inference problem we discussed above applies to networks in the same way it does to 
individual brain regions; however, framing research questions in terms of how networks 
associated with a given psychological process respond in intergroup contexts can generate more 
specific hypotheses and better constrain post-hoc theorizing about whole-brain activations. To 
date, few investigations have taken this approach (Mathur and colleagues, 2012, represent one 
notable exception).  
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Although research on networks has been somewhat neglected in intergroup neuroscience, 
many of the core psychological processes we have discussed—representing “us,” “them,” related 
affective and semantic associations, generating emotional and behavioral responses to in-group 
and out-group targets—are associated with well-articulated networks. First, there are networks 
that have, by some accounts, evolved or been co-opted specifically to support social interaction. 
For example, the default mode network (DMN) is a system of regions that is activated when 
individuals engage in conscious or unconscious introspection and mind-wandering (Buckner et 
al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Raichle et al., 2001). Interestingly, the 
mentalizing network, which includes regions associated with action perception and inferring 
others’ beliefs and traits, largely overlaps with the DMN (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Frith & 
Frith, 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). This has led some researchers to speculate that our 
“default” is to think about other people (e.g., Mitchell, 2008; Shilbach et al., 2008). What is 
fascinating about this network is that it is only recruited when people engage truly social 
cognition (e.g., impression formation as opposed to memorizing a list of facts about a person; 
Mitchell et al., 2006). In complement, evidence suggests that a specific region of this network is 
less active when people view images of extreme out-group targets, who people typically avoid 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006). These networks likely mediate a considerable amount of intergroup 
cognition and behavior and are therefore prime targets for investigation.   
Likewise, several domain-general networks, which are not dedicated specifically to social 
processes, are likely implicated in the detection and identification of in-group and out-group 
members, as well as the generation of approach and avoidance motivations and behaviors. For 
instance, dissociable networks have been implicated in the detection of salient or novel stimuli 
(Hughes, 2007; Kiehl et al., 2001; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004), 
The neuroscience of intergroup relations 	 39	
reward processing and appetitive behavior (Delgado, 2007; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009; Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Montague & Berns, 2002; 
O'Doherty, 2004; Peters & Büchel, 2010), avoidance and aversive responses (Barrett & Wager, 
2006; Yamada & Decety, 2009), and executive function and cognitive control (Amodio, 2008; 
Forbes & Grafman, 2010; Richeson et al., 2003). The last two decades of intergroup 
neuroscience research have seen an explosion of foundational, but somewhat exploratory brain-
mapping. Our belief is that future research, which places an emphasis on hypothesis testing in 
networks, will make significant strides toward building predictive, multilevel models of a variety 
of intergroup phenomena. 
Genetic approaches. Though both “nature” and “nurture” contribute to neural anatomy, 
individual differences in anatomical structure (and their relationship to prejudice) have increased 
interest in the heritability of intergroup biases. A recent study with an adult, German twin sample 
reports that monozygotic twins were more highly correlated than dizygotic twins on nationalism, 
patriotism, and generalized prejudice scores; however, further modeling accounting for 
(non)shared environmental effects found evidence only for the heritability of in-group love, not 
out-group derogation (Lewis, Kandler, & Rieman, 2013). Findings like these have sparked the 
search for the genetic bases of bias. For example, one study examined the interaction between 
OFC lesions and single nucleotide polymorphisms on implicit gender bias. These findings 
suggest that increased neural plasticity in OFC, facilitated by certain polymorphisms, may 
contribute to the inhibition of stereotype activation (Forbes et al., 2011). In another study, which 
examined the interaction between genetics and the environment on intergroup bias, participants 
with at least one short-allele of serotonin transporter gene polymorphism (5-HTTLPR), were 
more prejudiced and exhibited more discriminatory behavior toward a threatening out-group 
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relative to a non-threatening out-group; participants with two long-alleles, on the other hand, did 
not respond to the two out-groups differently (Cheon, Livingston, Hong, & Chiao, 2013). These 
recent studies build on a rich literature based on animal-models of social behavior (e.g., 
Robinson, Fernald, & Clayton, 2008), and represent the beginning of a new branch of human 
social neuroscience, integrating molecular, cellular, and systems levels of analysis. This work 
has the potential to elucidate more precise biological mechanisms that give rise to biased 
attitudes and behaviors toward out-groups.  
Enthusiasm for this approach, however, must be tempered by the understanding that there 
is not a one-to-one mapping between single candidate genes and particular behaviors. Individual 
genes do not, in isolation, determine behavior; they interact with other genes, and these complex 
interactions further interact with an individual’s environment (including other people, who have 
their own genetic constitutions). As such, a correlation between a particular polymorphism and, 
for example, prejudicial or discriminatory tendencies, should not be taken as evidence of the 
hard-wiring of a given psychological or behavioral phenomenon (Ratner & Kubota, 2012). 
 Other tools and approaches. Though EEG and fMRI are currently the most popular 
methods for investigating the neural bases of intergroup relations, many other complementary 
methods may help refine and revise existing theories. For instance, magnetoencephalograhy 
(MEG) is a technique for mapping brain activity that offers the best of both worlds: the temporal 
resolution of EEG and the spatial resolution of fMRI. MEG affords the possibility of examining 
the activity of neural systems as it unfolds in real time. This is particularly exciting in the context 
of networks of brain regions, as one could examine how the temporal dynamics of hypothesized 
networks (e.g., salience à evaluation) vary as a function of the target and the task at hand. This 
tool also captures a recent paradigm shift in systems neuroscience as conceptualizations of 
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human cognition have shifted from emphasizing the role of discrete regions to the dynamic 
interactions among multiple regions unfolding over time (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2007; Honey 
et al., 2012; Lerner et al., 2011).  
Work with lesion patients has also had a huge impact on the neuroscience of judgment 
and (non)social decision-making (e.g., Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Young et al., 2010a). Two studies have already used this approach to examine the role of the 
amygdala and OFC in race (Phelps, Cannistraci, & Cunningham, 2003) and gender (Milne & 
Grafmann, 2001) bias, respectively. In addition to brain lesions, more work could be done using 
techniques like temporary transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current 
stimulation to examine the causal role of different brain regions in target psychological processes 
(e.g. Young et al., 2010b), and to provide greater specificity about the necessity and sufficiency 
of implicated regions. 
Several other recent and exciting findings highlight additional avenues for future research. 
Work in psychopharmacology highlights the possibility of administering drugs as intergroup 
conflict interventions: for example, exogenously administered propranolol has been shown to 
reduce implicit racial bias (Terbeck et al., 2012). Studies in comparative psychology and 
neuroscience have revealed that neural circuits, which support the function of nonsocial 
behaviors critical for survival (e.g., escape), similarly support social cognition, decision-making, 
and behavior (e.g., gaze aversion; Chang et al., 2013). Finally, we believe that there is a lack of 
work at the computational level-of-analysis, which is ultimately necessary to bridge the neural 
and psychological levels-of-analysis in intergroup neuroscience (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). 
Ultimately, a complete understanding of the neuroscience of intergroup relations will require the 
efforts of scientists using all of these methods. 
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Future directions in psychology 
From categories to groups. One relatively unexplored avenue for future intergroup 
neuroscience research is the difference between the representation of social categories versus 
social groups. Social categories are inclusive structures that merely require all members share 
some feature (e.g., brunettes), whereas more “purposive groups…[are] intact social system[s], 
complete with boundaries, interdependence for some shared purpose, and differentiated member 
roles” (e.g., a sports team; p. 1210, Hackman & Katz, 2010). Note that this difference is better 
characterized as a continuum than a dichotomy; many important social identities lie somewhere 
in between the two extremes (e.g., Red Sox fans, a category whose members have a shared 
purpose but do not constitute a purposive group). And, as we have stressed throughout this paper, 
the salience of different social identities, be they categories or groups, depends largely on the 
social context.   
Many studies have explored the differences between processing a target as a group 
member (e.g., stereotype activation; Mitchell, Ames, Jenkins, & Banaji, 2009) as opposed to an 
individual (e.g., trait attribution; Mende-Siedlecki, Cai & Todorov, 2012; see Andersen, Klatzky 
& Murray, 1990 for direct comparison of the processes), however, few have looked at the 
features that make some categories and groups more cohesive than others. Extensive research has 
documented that not all social categories possess the features that give groups their potency: joint 
actions, shared goals, perceptual or psychological cohesion, group members’ similarity to one 
another, etc. (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & 
Paladino, 2000). These features matter because they shape how people respond to members of 
these groups, including increasing stereotyping, intergroup bias, and hostility (Abelson, 
Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, 
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& Schmader, 2006; Waytz & Young, 2012). One priority for future research lies in untangling 
how our minds and brains extract this information in intergroup contexts. Specifically, intergroup 
neuroscience research may want to (1) consider the biological substrates of Gestalt laws of 
perceptual organization as a target system for future research (not unlike the work on social 
status and IPL which is associated with representing numerical magnitude; Chiao et al., 2008) 
and (2) examine how this system interacts with other neural systems to evaluate and guide social 
interactions in group contexts. 
The self in social groups. Another important avenue for future research is the 
investigation of how acting as a member of a group change representations of one’s self 
(Ellemers, 2012; Packer & Van Bavel, 2014). There is a large literature on how the self and 
similar versus dissimilar others (in-group and out-group members) are represented in the mind 
and brain; as we have already noted, representations of similar others and in-group members 
show greater overlap with self-representations than representations of out-group members do 
(e.g., Jenkins et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2006; Volz et al., 2009). But people’s behavior changes 
when they join groups. For example, individuals tend to engage in more hostile behaviors toward 
opponents when acting as part of a group than when acting alone (e.g., Meier & Hinsz, 2004). 
How and to what extent do self-representations change in intergroup contexts?  
A recent fMRI study suggests that acting with a group in a competitive context reduces 
the salience of one’s own personal moral standards. Consistent with previous competitive groups 
research, participants harmed out-group members more than in-group members. Critically, the 
degree to which participants were willing to carry out such harm was associated with the degree 
to which they exhibited reduced activity in a region of mPFC implicated in self-referential 
processing in response to moral statements. This pattern was only observed when participants 
The neuroscience of intergroup relations 	 44	
were competing in a group, not when competing alone. These results suggest that acting as part 
of a competitive group may reduce the salience of one’s own moral standards and, in turn, enable 
out-group harm (Cikara, Jenkins, Dufour, & Saxe, 2013). Future research should examine what 
other aspects of self-representations change when individuals act as representatives of their 
groups rather than as agents on their own behalf.  
A second-person intergroup neuroscience. The third psychological future direction we 
highlight is a greater incorporation of enriched social stimuli and intergroup interaction in real-
time. Most of the literature in intergroup neuroscience can be fairly criticized for focusing on 
individuals’ responses to static images, words, or games representing in-group/out-group 
members and their behavior. However, social cognition is fundamentally different when people 
actually interact with others rather than merely observing them or being led to believe they are 
interacting with them (Schilbach et al., 2013). Real world intergroup interactions are far richer 
than our current methods appreciate, and likely engage a far broader network of biological 
substrates. Recent forays into “brain to brain” methods and analyses demonstrate that researchers 
do not necessarily relinquish experimental control or analytical precision by studying real social 
interactions (Hasson et al., 2012). For example, in one fMRI experiment, participants played a 
cooperative game with a partner, knowing that in one condition the partner’s behavior was pre-
recorded, and in the other that they were interacting in real-time via a video feed. Relative to the 
pre-recorded condition, playing the game in real time elicited greater responses in brain regions 
associated with social cognition and reward (Redcay et al., 2010). These results suggest that 
incorporating actual interaction in the neuroscience of intergroup relations may reveal new 
targets for investigation, including systems that support communication and shared 
understanding (or a lack thereof, between groups in conflict; Cikara, Honey, Paluck, & Hasson, 
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2013). Future work should therefore move toward dyadic interactions, and ultimately large group 
interactions, to understand how social identities create emergent “group-level” cognitive 
phenomenon. This work not only captures the essence of group contexts, but it may also have 
important implications for understanding and cultivating successful leaders and educators who 
are tasked with coordinating collective cognition. 
Societal and cultural factors. An examination of the influence of societal and cultural 
backgrounds will continue to play a large role in understanding the boundary conditions of many 
findings in the neuroscience of intergroup relations (e.g., Chiao, Mathur, Harada, & Lipke, 2009; 
Jost & Amodio, 2012; Moran et al., 2011). For example, Korean and white American 
participants both exhibited increased mPFC and bilateral TPJ activation when viewing same-race 
versus other-race targets’ emotional suffering; however, Korean participants reported a 
significantly larger empathy gap relative to white American participants. This difference was 
correlated with a cultural preference for hierarchy among Korean participants (Cheon et al., 
2011). All intergroup interaction occurs within a broader societal or cultural context and work 
that examines group processes within these broader contexts—including social dominance 
hierarchies and system level factors (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Jost & Banaji, 1994)—is 
necessary for providing a complete account of intergroup neuroscience. We believe that studying 
the fundamental structures and features of intergroup relations, using all of these approaches, 
will continue to advance our understanding of how and why groups and their members behave as 
they do. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Throughout this paper we have highlighted recent findings in the neuroscience of 
intergroup relations, emphasizing cases in which existing psychological and neuroscience 
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theories have been revised once the relevant phenomena have been investigated in intergroup 
contexts or with novel groups (see Table 1 for a review). Work in this area has already refined 
extant models of intergroup relations and documented the widely distributed network of brain 
regions that supports intergroup cognition. Importantly, identifying the biological bases of these 
processes does not suggest that specific in-group and out-group effects are “hard-wired.” On the 
contrary, one of the major contributions of this recent work is the demonstration of how flexibly 
these biological systems represent the self and others, carving up the social world into “us” and 
“them” at the toss of a coin. This is an especially important message to communicate to lay 
consumers of research on the psychology and neuroscience of intergroup relations since it 
implies considerable promise for reducing prejudice and intergroup conflict. 
Work on racial bias is often interpreted as evidence of more general in-group/out-group 
processes. While the investigation of social categories such as race is important for 
understanding pervasive social inequities and obstacles, using this work to make broad 
inferences about group processes can be problematic for several reasons. First, race is 
confounded with many other factors including visual properties of the stimuli, familiarity, 
stereotype content, etc. Thus, it is difficult to know whether the effects are driven by group 
identification, per se. Second, self-categorization is extremely flexible, meaning that existing 
theories of the neural bases of intergroup relations are likely limited to specific contexts. We 
argue that using mixed-race and novel groups, in complement with real groups, and manipulating 
features of interest (e.g., motivational salience of the in-group versus out-group) will prove 
useful for advancing theories of the cognitive, affective, and neural bases of intergroup relations.  
Integrating classic theories and contemporary models of intergroup relations with the 
investigation of the biological bases of intergroup dynamics will benefit both psychologists and 
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neuroscientists. Not only does our proposed approach account for discrepancies in the existing 
research, it generates a number of hypotheses and directions for future research. This approach 
also confers greater consilience; theories that operate at multiple levels of analysis are more 
likely to stand the test of time and present several opportunities for collaboration between 
psychologists and neuroscientists (Wilson, 1998). Furthermore, the exchange of knowledge is bi-
directional: we emphasize both how biological processes support social cognition and behavior, 
and how social influences modulate biological processes. The work on intergroup neuroscience 
should not be construed as a brain-mapping exercise; it is about developing models that can be 
tested using cognitive and behavioral tasks. Specifically, this research has the potential to benefit 
the psychological study of intergroup relations, especially when predictions from neural models 
contradict or adjudicate among multiple psychological models (Mather, Cacioppo, & Kanwisher, 
2013). Although it is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is our hope that greater integration 
across methods and levels of analysis will ultimately lay the foundation for superior 
interventions and social policy. 
Conclusion 
In summary, initial work on intergroup neuroscience highlights the dynamic nature of 
social identity and the contextual factors that shape intergroup relations. We believe an 
understanding of these factors will resolve discrepant findings in the literature, provide 
organizational principles for understanding the core elements of intergroup dynamics, and help 
generate novel insights for social, developmental, evolutionary, and cognitive psychologists. 
Ultimately, we hope this work will help generate novel interventions and inform social policy to 
reduce intergroup conflict.  
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Footnotes 
1	Relationship partners (i.e., dyadic partners) can also become strongly integrated with the 
representation of one’s self (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Beckes, Coan, & Hasselmo, 
2013). However, dyads differ from groups in several important respects (e.g., dyads are more 
ephemeral and evoke stronger emotions; several key group phenomena, including coalitions and 
minority influence, cannot occur in dyads; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Moreland, Hogg, and 
Hains, 1994), placing a thorough analysis of dyads outside the scope of the current review. The 
neuroscience of social relationships is a rapidly growing area of inquiry (see Beckes & Coan, 
2014); exactly how dyadic relationship phenomena relate to intergroup phenomena in the brain is 
a wide open question. 
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Table 1. Summary of relevant brain regions and neuroendocrine systems, their associated general functions, and original/updated 
theories of function from intergroup relations research. Subscripts denote the following: (a) majority subject population (b) minority 
subject population or (c) majority and/or minority status of subject population was not reported in the study 
 
Biological 
target Task Moderator General function Groups application Citation 
amygdala 
Viewing other-race 
faces in Blackb & 
Whitea participants 
 
Individual differences 
correlated with IAT 
(Cunningham et al., 
2004) and startle eye 
blink (Phelps et al., 
2000) 
Fear conditioning; 
processing negative 
stimuli 
Negativity (disgust and fear) 
toward stigmatized groups Hart et al., 2000 
 
Viewing in-group 
faces in a mixed-race 
minimal group 
paradigma 
 
Segregation of relevant 
from irrelevant to 
enhance perception of 
important stimuli 
Responsive to the most 
motivationally relevant stimuli 
in the absence of other salient 
groups (e.g., race) 
Van Bavel et al., 
2008 
 
 
Playing an interactive 
game in an unstable 
(vs. stable) hierarchy 
elicits greater activitya 
 
 
Processing social 
emotional stimuli; 
Threat response 
Emotional arousal related to 
the possible social hierarchical 
consequences of performance 
Zink et al., 2008 
fusiform 
gyrus 
Viewing own-race 
faces in Blackb & 
Whitea participants 
 
Correlated with own-
race bias on recognition 
memory task 
Processing and 
individuating faces; 
perceptual expertise 
Superior perceptual expertise 
with own-race faces may 
moderate the own-race bias 
Golby et al., 
2001 
 
Viewing in-group 
faces in a mixed-race 
minimal group 
paradigma 
 
Flexible involvement in 
individuation of faces- 
motivational relevance 
 
Sensitive to shifts in self-
categorization, aiding 
response to motivationally-
relevant faces, regardless of 
expertise  
Van Bavel et al., 
2008 
- FFA Greater recognition memory for minimal  
Flexible involvement in 
individuation of faces- 
 
In-group members are 
Van Bavel et al., 
2011 
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groups in- (vs. out-
group) facesa 
motivational relevance processed as individuals more 
than out-group members—or: 
individuating in-group 
members is more automatic 
than out-group 
 
 
 
 
mPFC 
 
Playing a game with 
another in a 
competitive condition 
(as compared with 
cooperative 
condition)c 
 
Playing an interactive 
game in an unstable 
(vs. stable) hierarchy 
elicits greater activitya 
 
 
 
 
Mentalizing 
Competing with another 
requires maintenance of the 
perspectives of both self and 
others 
Decety et al., 
2004 
 Mentalizing; Person perception 
Social cognition related to the 
possible social hierarchical 
consequences of performance 
(including reputation) 
Zink et al., 2008 
 
 
Salience of personal 
moral standards while 
competing in a group 
(independent self-
reference task) c 
Correlated with 
willingness to harm 
competitors 
Self-referential 
processing 
Competing as a group can 
reduce the salience of one’s 
own moral standards and 
enable harm 
Cikara et al., 
2013 
 
Viewing in-group 
members in a painful 
situation, in Black 
participants onlyb 
Correlated with in-
group bias in empathic 
ratings 
Cognitive empathic 
processing 
In addition to affective 
empathic processing normally 
occurring with empathy, 
regardless of group, 
extraordinary empathy for 
one’s in-group involves 
cognitive empathic processing 
Mathur et al., 
2010 
 
Playing a prisoner’s 
dilemma game with 
an in-group memberc 
Correlated with greater 
report of in-group bias 
 
Mentalizing 
 
Mentalizing about an in-group 
member is facilitated by 
perceived similarities with 
oneself 
Rilling et al., 
2008 
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TPJ 
- lTPJ 
 
Viewing same-race 
vs. other-race targets’ 
emotional suffering, in 
Koreansa and 
Caucasian 
Americansa 
Greater activity in 
Koreans correlated with 
preference for social 
hierarchy 
Mentalizing 
Cultural values may directly 
modulate the systems involved 
in representing others’ mental 
states, and in turn, empathic 
processing 
Cheon et al., 
2011 
 
 
 
- rTPJ 
 
 
 
During a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game with a 
minimal groups in-
group memberc 
 
 
 
Correlated with greater 
report of in-group bias 
 
 
 
Mentalizing 
 
 
Mentalizing about an in-group 
member is facilitated by 
perceived similarities with 
oneself 
 
Rilling et al., 
2008 
OFC 
 
Playing a game with 
another in a 
competitive condition 
(as compared with 
cooperative 
condition)c 
 
Making behavioral  
Choices; encoding 
relative value 
Cooperating with others is 
socially rewarding 
Decety et al., 
2004 
 
 
Choosing to allocate 
monetary resources 
equitably in a Dictator 
gamec 
 
 Value representation Choosing to act pro-socially has high reward-value 
Zaki & Mitchell, 
2011 
ventral 
striatum 
 
Engaging in mutually 
cooperative social 
interactions in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
gamec 
 Reward processing 
Engaging in a mutually 
cooperative social interaction 
has high reward-value 
Rilling et al., 
2002 
 
 
Distributing monetary 
resource to self and 
othersc 
 Reward processing 
Reward signals are modulated 
by social factors (e.g., 
inequality-averse preferences) 
Tricomi et al., 
2010 
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Seeing the pain of a 
unfair confederate in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
gamec 
Correlated with 
expressed desire for 
revenge 
Reward processing Serving justice is rewarding Singer et al., 2006 
 
Viewing higher-
ranked compared to 
lower-ranked 
individuals (compared 
to oneself)a 
Low SES show greater 
activity to lower status 
targets; high SES 
replicate original 
findings     (Ly et al., 
2011) 
Reward salience; 
valuation 
Social status inference 
involves valuation dependent 
on motivational factors 
Zink et al., 2008 
 
 
Watching rival teams 
failing to score 
(correlates with 
reported pleasure)c 
Effects holds even 
against a lower-ranked 
team 
Valuation; motivation 
Increased reward value of out-
group failure may contribute to 
counter-empathic responses 
Cikara et al., 
2011 
 
 
Watching a rival 
team’s fan experience 
painc 
 
Correlated with a 
decreased willingness 
to accept a proportion 
of the fan’s pain 
 
Reward processing 
 
Increased reward value of out-
group failure may contribute to 
counter-empathic responses 
 
 
Hein et al., 2010 
dorsal 
striatum 
 
Administering 
punishments that 
reduced a defector’s 
payoff c  
 
 
Correlated with greater 
will to incur a self-cost 
in order to punish 
Reward processing Punishing a norm violation is rewarding 
DeQuervain et 
al., 2004 
IPL 
 
During comparison of 
people who are closer 
to one another in a 
social hierarchya 
 
 
Representation of 
scalar magnitudes 
(processing higher vs. 
lower numerical values) 
Social status inference recruits 
regions involved in numerical 
processing  
Chiao et al., 
2008 
cortical 
midline 
subsyste
m of DMN 
Viewing racial ingroup 
members in painful 
situations, in African 
American 
participantsb 
Correlated with greater 
racial identification 
Self-referential 
processing (e.g., 
introspection, personal 
significance, affective 
processing) 
 
Highly identified minority group 
members may empathize by 
accessing their own feelings 
and having a personal, 
affective experience 
 
Mathur et al., 
2012 
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ACC 
 
Viewing same- (vs. 
other-race) faces 
experience pain in 
Chinesea and 
Caucasianb 
participants 
Differences not 
reflected in self-report 
ratings of pain intensity 
others experience 
First-person pain 
experience 
Enhanced sharing of pain for 
in-group members may result 
in increased empathy concern 
Xu et al., 2009 
 
 
Viewing others in 
painful situations, 
regardless of group, 
in Blackb & Whitea 
participants 
“Extraordinary” 
response among Black 
participants seeing in-
group 
Affective empathic 
processing   
Mathur et al., 
2010 
      
Anterior 
insula 
 
Viewing same- (vs. 
other-race) faces 
experience pain in 
Chinesea and 
Caucasianb 
participants 
Differences not 
reflected in self-report 
ratings of pain intensity 
others experience 
First- person pain 
experience 
Enhanced sharing of pain for 
in-group members may result 
in increased empathy concern 
Xu et al., 2009 
 
 
Viewing others in 
painful situations, 
regardless of group in 
Blackb & Whitea 
participants 
 Affective empathic processing   
Mathur et al., 
2010 
 
Reading descriptions 
of physically painful 
(vs. non-painful) 
events, in Israeli, 
Arab and South 
American immigrants/ 
visitorsb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generalized processing 
of pain experience 
Shared pain network may be 
influenced by current task 
goals, and is not tied to 
specific modality (e.g., verbal 
vs. pictorial representation) 
Bruneau et al., 
2012 
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Viewing competitive, 
high-status targets’ 
good fortunesc 
Correlated with 
willingness to harm 
competitive high-status 
targets 
Shared neural circuit for 
pain 
 
Shared pain network is 
influenced by group 
distinctions and status, with 
potential effects on behavior  
(e.g., harm) 
 
Cikara & Fiske, 
2011b 
Oxytocin 
 
Playing trust gamec  
Facilitates affiliative 
motivation and pro-
social behavior 
May help to reduce conflict Kosfeld et al., 2005 
 Playing trust gamea,b  
 
Facilitates “tend and 
defend” behavior 
toward the in-group in 
particular 
Supports parochial behavior 
that undergirds several 
instantiations of in-group bias 
De Dreu et al., 
2010 
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Figure 1. Anatomical images of several key brain regions associated with group categorization and evaluation, functional relations 
between groups, empathy, and pro-social and anti-social behavior. As such, this figure is meant to serve as a guide to the location of 
various regions we reference frequently (not to represent a neural circuit supporting one process in particular). mPFC = medial 
prefrontal cortex. OFC = orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
 
